Citizens give their government legitimacy and authority because that is what they have always done. Unfortunately, there is sometimes also a tendency to blur the distinction between the two concepts, and a lot of confusion arises from that. Consent was considered the essence of legitimate rule. Granting to skeptics that democratic decision-making mechanisms might be problematic for both feasibility reasons and moral reasons, they argue that some form of deliberation is primarily what is needed to address the legitimacy deficit that global governance institutions face see also Appiah 2006; List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010. The Order of Public Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The ruler claims to be God or govern in the name of God.
A right to revolution would be in contradiction with the idea that individuals are bound by public law, but without the idea of citizens being bound by public law, there cannot be a civil state—only anarchy. This is a minimal characterization. Democratic instrumentalism is the view that democratic decision-making procedures are at best a means for reaching just outcomes, and whether or not legitimacy requires democracy depends on the outcomes that democratic decision-making brings about. Rawls conceives of the domain of public reason as limited to matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice and as applying primarily—but not only—to judges, government officials, and candidates for public office when they decide on matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. When are political institutions and the decisions made within them appropriately called legitimate? The three types of political legitimacy are: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal.
For the head of the civil state is under an obligation to obey public reason and to enact only laws to which all individuals could consent. These aims and objectives have the potential as they constitute a set of ethically infused ideals to capture the imagination of the people. But this is just a reflection of the fact that legitimacy is a weaker idea than justice. Because they perform very well. What makes citizens obey or feel loyal toward their governments? An authority viewed as legitimate often has the right and justification to exercise power. Let us call this the problem of global legitimacy. If it can successfully be shown that having a state is morally better than not having a state Simmons 2001: 125 , the state is justified.
Estlund uses normative consent theory as the basis for an account of democratic legitimacy, understood as the permissibility of using coercion to enforce authority. He argues that while legitimacy establishes a justification for the state to issue directives, it does not create even a prima facie duty to obey its commands. You justify your rule by pointing out you won the previous election. A political system is in fact an articulated set of ideals, ends and purposes which help the members to interpret the past explain the present and provide a vision for the future. But legitimacy is important precisely because it shapes the behavior and beliefs of non-supporters. This problem arises when the evaluation of alternative outcomes is logically connected to a set of independent premises. That a society might decide to revert from the legitimate government of a rational—legal authority to the charismatic government of a leader, e.
Insofar as democracy is seen as necessary for political legitimacy, when are democratic decisions legitimate? An alternative interpretation of the public reason account focuses on convergence, not consensus Gaus 2011. The absence of a general moral duty to obey the state thus does not imply that all states are necessarily illegitimate Simmons 2001: 137. Ronald Dworkin 1986: 191 defends a view of this sort. As mentioned above, some accounts of epistemic democracy draw on the Condorcet jury theorem. First, what are global governance institutions and in what ways can and should they be thought of as taking over roles from states or their governments? Active participation by all may not generate a consensus. Authority stands for a right to rule—a right to issue commands and, possibly, to enforce these commands using coercive power. The idea of a contract is nevertheless relevant for his understanding of legitimacy.
Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Whether an actual political regime respects the constraints of the natural law is thus at least one factor that determines its legitimacy. Which is why I used President Trump as an example. They claim the right to rule and to create obligations to be obeyed, and as long as these claims are met with sufficient acquiescence, they are authoritative. According to a second important interpretation, by contrast, the main function of legitimacy is precisely to justify coercive power. One problem with this view is that to get off the ground, it needs to treat the value of political equality as less important than the value of those other equalities that inform the perfectionist standard. In political science, legitimacy usually is understood as the popular acceptance and recognition by the public of the authority of a governing régime, whereby authority has political power through consent and mutual understandings, not coercion.
Contemporarily, such divine-right legitimacy is manifest in the of the est. Although Locke emphasises consent, consent is not, however, sufficient for legitimate authority because an authority that suspends the natural law is necessarily illegitimate e. Buchanan and Keohane agree that the attempt to rule without legitimacy is an unjustified exercise of power. Others have put forward conceptions based on state consent. Legitimacy, for Kant, depends on a particular interpretation of the social contract. In political systems where this is not the case, unpopular régimes survive because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential élite. When a political authority fails to secure consent or oversteps the boundaries of the natural law, it ceases to be legitimate and, therefore, there is no longer an obligation to obey its commands.
Buchanan 2002 also argues that legitimacy is concerned with the justification of coercive power. Examples of relevant policy areas are trade or the environment. He does not believe that states need to have equal weight in international institutions. This raises the question how the concept of legitimacy may apply—beyond the nation state and decisions made within it—to the international and global context. Many are not convinced that such instrumentalist reasoning provides a satisfactory account of political legitimacy. He claims that the moral duty to obey the commands of legitimate political authority arises only if additional conditions are met. There are several ways in which pure proceduralism might be understood.
Therefore, the institutions of traditional government usually are historically continuous, as in and. Political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing, without which a government will suffer legislative deadlock s and collapse. Is it primarily a descriptive or a normative concept? In contemporary political philosophy, many, but by no means all, hold that democracy is necessary for political legitimacy. A political decision is legitimized on the basis of public reason, on this account, if reasonable persons can converge on that decision. His conception of legitimacy is thus better described as a version of what Rawls calls imperfect proceduralism Rawls 1971: 85. This requirement includes a demand for minimal democracy. This conception of legitimacy is necessarily a moralized one: the legitimacy of political authority depends on what morality requires.